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MADISON AND THE MENTALLY ILL: THE DEATH
PENALTY FOR THE WEAK, NOT THE WORST
Corinna Barrett Lain*†
INTRODUCTION
Regent’s symposium on mental health and the law offers an
opportunity to pause and think about a particularly acute issue within
that larger framework: the treatment of those with severe mental illness1
in our capital justice system. A case currently pending before the United
States Supreme Court, Madison v. Alabama,2 is an apt place to start, as
the Court just heard oral arguments in early October.3 The question in
Madison is whether the condemned inmate is competent to be executed.4
I will begin by telling you a bit about the facts of Madison, and then I will
use the case to launch a larger discussion about how the severely mentally
ill get caught in the capital justice system and why that is a problem.
Vernon Madison was sentenced to death for killing a police officer
back in 1985, and has now spent over 30 years on death row.5 Why so long,
you ask. The answer is reversible error. First, Madison’s conviction was
*
S.D. Roberts and Sandra Moore Professor of Law, University of Richmond School
of Law. I thank the Regent Law Review for inviting me to give this address and for its hard
work in publishing my remarks. I also thank MaryAnn Grover for her invaluable research
assistance, and Erin Collins, Jessica Erickson, Jim Gibson, Michael Meltsner, Luke Norris,
Scott Sundby, and Allison Tate for their helpful comments and suggestions along the way.
†
The following are remarks from the keynote speech given at Regent University’s
31st Annual Law Review Symposium on mental health and the law, on November 2, 2018.
For a full schedule of symposium panels and events, see https://www.regent.edu/
app/uploads/sites/3/2018/10/Regent-University-Law-Review-Symposium-Schedule-2018.pdf.
1
Some use the term “serious mental illness,” while others use the term “severe
mental illness.” These terms tend to be used interchangeably, but given that all mental
illness is serious, while only a discreet subset is severe, I use the latter term here. See
generally Kenneth T. Kinter, What’s in a Name: “Serious”, “Severe”, and “Severe and
Persistent”, 21 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. REHABILITATION 52–54 (2017), https://www.
psychosocial.com/IJPR_21/What_is_in_a_Name_Kinter.html (differentiating serious mental
illness from severe mental illness and explaining that severe mental illness is a subset of
serious mental illnesses). For further discussion on what the term “severe mental illness”
entails, see infra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
2
See 138 S. Ct. 1172, 1172 (2018) (granting Madison’s petition for writ of certiorari).
See Editor’s note on Madison, which was decided February 27, 2019, at the end of this essay.
3
Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Madison v. Alabama, No. 17-7505 (U.S. argued
Oct. 2, 2018) [hereinafter Oral Argument].
4
See 17-7505 Madison v. Alabama Question Presented, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S.
(Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/17-07505qp.pdf (summarizing one issue in
Madison as whether the State can legally execute “a prisoner whose mental disability leaves
him without memory of his commission of the capital offense”).
5
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, 4, Madison, No. 17-7505 (U.S. filed Jan. 18,
2018) [hereinafter Petition].
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overturned because prosecutors unconstitutionally excluded black jurors
from his trial.6 Then on retrial, it was overturned because the prosecution
put on expert testimony in the case that was so obviously inadmissible
that it constituted plain error.7 At Madison’s third trial, the jury actually
recommended life, but Alabama was one of very few states that allowed a
judge to override a jury’s recommended sentence,8 and that is exactly what
the judge in Madison’s case did: he overrode the jury’s recommendation of
life and imposed a death sentence instead.9
Suffice it to say that for Madison, it has been a long road. But here
we are, over 30 years later. Madison is now 68 years old and has had a
series of strokes, two of them nearly fatal, which have left him with
permanent brain damage and a condition called Vascular Dementia, a
cerebral vascular disorder that is degenerative, so it is progressively
getting worse.10 On MRIs, you can actually see the areas of Madison’s
brain where the tissue is dead, and when you compare multiple MRIs over
the years, you can see that the area of dead tissue in his brain is growing.11
Madison’s disorder has manifested itself in a number of ways. He has
suffered an IQ loss over the years that now puts him in the borderline
range of intellectual functioning.12 He slurs his speech.13 He cannot recite
the alphabet past the letter “G.”14 He cannot count by threes, and he

6

Madison v. State, 545 So. 2d 94, 99 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987).
Madison v. State, 620 So. 2d 62, 73 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (reversing the conviction
due to erroneously admitted expert testimony based on facts not in evidence, despite the fact
that the defendant did not object at trial, because it “constituted an error so obvious that the
failure to notice it seriously affected the fairness or integrity of the proceedings”).
8
Madison v. State, 718 So. 2d 90, 94, 103–04 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997); see EQUAL
JUSTICE INITIATIVE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN ALABAMA: JUDGE OVERRIDE 4 (2011),
https://eji.org/sites/default/files/death-penalty-in-alabama-judge-override.pdf (noting that as
of 2011, judicial override is legal only in Alabama, Delaware, and Florida). Alabama finally
abandoned judicial overrides in 2017; it was the last state in the country to do so. See Kent
Faulk, Alabama Gov. Kay Ivey signs bill: Judges can no longer override juries in death penalty
cases,
AL.COM
(Apr.
11,
2017),
https://www.al.com/news/birmingham/
index.ssf/2017/04/post_317.html (showing that the Alabama Governor signed a bill into law
doing away with judicial overrides in capital murder cases).
9
Madison, 718 So. 2d at 94. The same judge overrode jury recommendations for the
imposition of life sentences in five other capital cases—this was more than any other judge
in Alabama. Petition, supra note 5, at 6 n.3.
10 Petition, supra note 5, at 1–2, 9–10, 12.
11 Brief of Petitioner at 8, Madison v. Alabama, No. 17-7505 (U.S. filed May 22, 2018).
12 Id. at 10. Borderline intellectual functioning refers to IQ scores in the 70 to 75
range, which places a person on the borderline of criteria for the diagnosis of intellectual
disability under the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) V. See
Amy Logsdon, Borderline Intellectual Functioning, VERYWELLMIND (Apr. 1, 2019),
https://www.verywellmind.com/what-is-borderline-intellectual-functioning-2161698.
13 Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 29.
14 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 11, at 11.
7
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cannot walk without assistance.15 He is disoriented as to time and place,
so he cannot tell you the date, or the month, or even the day of the week.16
He continually soils himself because he does not remember that there is a
toilet right next to his bed and he is legally blind so he does not see it
sitting there.17 Most significantly in this particular case, Madison has no
memory of his crime—and I want to take a moment to name that.
Madison’s crime was the murder of a police officer, someone who gave his
professional life to protecting others. At this point in time, Madison has
no memory of that; he has no recall of the murder that put him on death
row.18 The area of his brain where tissue is dying is the area that controls
memory; that is why his disorder is a form of dementia.19
Importantly, none of this is contested.20 There is no claim that
Madison is malingering, no claim that he is making this up.21 You can see
the brain damage on the MRIs; the evidence is quite clear. Madison’s
condition is not in question.
Also not contested is the legal standard governing competence to be
executed, at least in the abstract. Both parties agree that competency to
be executed requires an inmate to have a rational understanding of the
reason for his or her execution.22 Madison says he lacks that
understanding because he cannot remember the crime, and thus cannot
understand the punishment. Alabama argues that Madison’s failure to
remember the crime for which he is being executed does not, in and of
itself, render him incompetent.23 By Alabama’s view, Madison
understands that the state wants to put him to death as punishment for
a murder that he was found to have committed, and that is enough.24 He
may not remember the murder. He may even deny that it happened
(which, he does).25 The state may have to keep telling him about it because
he keeps forgetting. But the bottom line is that Madison understands that
the state says he killed someone and wants to execute him as a result, and
that rational understanding is (at least according to Alabama) all that the
15

Id. at 1, 11.
Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 6.
17 Id. at 17; Brief of Petitioner, supra note 11, at 4–5.
18 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 11, at 10.
19 Petition, supra note 5, at 9–10.
20 See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 11, at 9 (discussing that evidence of Madison’s
medical condition and dementia was unrebutted); see also Brief of Respondent at 13,
Madison v. Alabama, No. 17-7505 (U.S. filed July 31, 2018) (conceding the fact of Madison’s
dementia and arguing that, even if Madison does not remember the offense, he is not thereby
rendered incompetent).
21 Brief of Petitioner, supra note 11, at 12.
22 Id. at 22–23; Brief of Respondent, supra note 20, at 13.
23 Brief of Respondent, supra note 20, at 13, 20.
24 Brief of Respondent, supra note 20, at 22.
25 Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 19; Brief of Respondent, supra note 20, at 22.
16
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Supreme Court requires.26 The trial court apparently agreed, although the
basis for its ruling was not as clear as one might have hoped.27
That is a basic recitation of the facts and what is at stake. At oral
arguments, Justice Sotomayor summarized all of this quite nicely when
she said:
So we have a man here who . . . can’t move on his own, can’t remember
where the bathroom is next to him, can’t see, slurs his words. He’s really
not quite there. But he knows that someone says he committed a
murder and that they’re trying to kill him, but he doesn’t understand
why. He can’t be present enough in time to rationally understand or
reflect on what he has done because he can’t retain information for
long.28

And why is it, she asked counsel for the State of Alabama, that the law
says it is okay to execute this man?29
Madison v. Alabama is a fascinating case, and the question that
Justice Sotomayor asks—the question that the Supreme Court is
currently grappling with—is a worthy one. But in this address, I am going
to take a step back and ask a more fundamental question, a question about
how someone in Madison’s position from the start—someone suffering
from severe mental illness not only at the end of the capital justice process,
but from the beginning (and Madison may well fit that bill too)30—could
be at risk of receiving the death penalty in the first place. One might not
care what happens to someone who has their full faculties at the time of
26

Brief of Respondent, supra note 20, at 22.
See Order, State of Alabama v. Madison, No. 1985-001385.80 (Cir. Ct. Mobile
Cnty., Ala., Jan. 16, 2018) (ruling that Madison did not satisfy the substantial threshold of
insanity required by the United States Supreme Court for a stay of execution). There appears
to be some dispute over what the trial court held and over what the state’s position was
before the trial court. Compare Brief of Petitioner, supra note 11, at 21, 23–24 (asserting
that the circuit court reasoned that vascular dementia does not constitute a medical
condition that meet the standard for incompetency) with Brief of Respondent, supra note 20,
at 22 (asserting that the circuit court found that Madison rationally understood his
punishment even though he suffered from dementia). The clearest recitation of the trial
court’s holding appears to be the district court’s denial of habeas relief, which states that the
trial court based its finding of competency, at least in part on the evidence that Madison did
not suffer from paranoia, delusion or psychosis. Madison v. Dunn, No. 16-00191-KD-M, 2016
WL 2732193, at *9, *11 (S.D. Ala. May 10, 2016), rev’d sub nom. Madison v. Comm’r. Ala.
Dep’t of Corr., 851 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 2017). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which
reversed the district court on this issue, also understood Alabama to argue that which it
steadfastly denies arguing in the Supreme Court. See Madison v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr.,
851 F.3d 1173, 1178, 1188 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he State suggests that only a prisoner
suffering from gross delusions can show incompetency under [the established standard].”).
28 Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 45.
29 Id.
30 See Petition, supra note 5, at 5 (“Mr. Madison’s struggles with mental illness had
been observed since he was an adolescent, including by prison psychiatrists in Mississippi
as documented in medical records introduced by the defense. To control his illness, Mr.
Madison had been prescribed numerous anti-psychotic medications.”).
27

2019]

THE DEATH PENALTY FOR THE WEAK, NOT THE WORST

213

the crime and throughout the trial and sentencing phase, but then loses
those faculties at the end (although I would hope we would care here too)—
but for every Madison, there are dozens of capital offenders who suffer
from severe mental illness when they come into the capital justice system,
and they are my interest here. My question is how it is that we—and I use
“we” here intentionally, because when the state executes, it executes in
our name—so how is it that we would even be thinking about executing
the severely mentally ill, given that the death penalty is supposed to be
for the worst of the worst offenders?
The premise here is worth pausing to underscore. The Supreme Court
has said time and again that the death penalty is not just for any
murderer; it is for the worst of the worst offenders.31 On this point, the
Court has not budged. The fact that the death penalty was palpably not
being meted out in this fashion was what led the Supreme Court to strike
it down in 1972.32 And the states’ adoption of so-called “guided discretion”
statutes that promised to channel jury discretion to remedy this deficiency
is what led the Court to reinstate the death penalty four years later in
1976.33 As the Supreme Court stated in its 2008 decision Kennedy v.
Louisiana, “[C]apital punishment must ‘be limited to those offenders who
commit a “narrow category of the most serious crimes” and whose extreme
culpability makes them “the most deserving of execution.”’”34 This is the
core constitutional proviso that comes with the state’s power to put people
to death: it is reserved for the worst, most culpable offenders and the
worst, most serious crimes.
And that brings me back to my question: how is it that we are in the
position of executing the severely mentally ill in the first place? By
definition, they are not the worst offenders; they are severely mentally ill.

31 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (“Capital punishment must be limited
to those offenders who commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and whose
extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’”) (quoting Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)).
32 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (invalidating the death
penalty in certain cases as a violation of the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment);
see also id. at 293–94 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“When the punishment of death is inflicted
in a trivial number of the cases in which it is legally available, the conclusion is virtually
inescapable that it is being inflicted arbitrarily. Indeed, it smacks of little more than a lottery
system. . . . When the rate of infliction is at this low level, it is highly implausible that only
the worst criminals or the criminals who commit the worst crimes are selected for this
punishment.”).
33 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187, 195 (1976) (stating that reinstating the
death penalty is “an extreme sanction, suitable to the most extreme of crimes,” and
explaining that “the concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be imposed
in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures
that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance”).
34 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 568).
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By “severely mentally ill,” I mean those who have a diagnosed severe
mental illness in the DSM-5—the American Psychiatric Association’s
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.35 The DSM-5 is
the gold standard, and it defines severe mental illness as a clinically
recognized, significant disturbance in cognition, regulating emotion, or
behavior that reflects a severe impairment or dysfunction in mental
functioning and is relatively persistent over time.36 I am talking about
illnesses like schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, that sort of thing.37 These
are people who are seriously sick; they are not just having a bad day.
Now that we know who I am talking about, I can turn to the what.
What I will be talking about is how the severely mentally ill could be at
risk of the death penalty in the first place. In some ways, Madison is an
anomaly. Although there is reason to think that he suffered from a severe
mental illness all along,38 his case before the Supreme Court considers
only his condition as it has developed and deteriorated from his stay on
death row. But in other ways Madison is not an anomaly; he is but one
example of a much larger phenomenon. As I will discuss, states impose
the death penalty on people with severe mental illness all the time; in fact,
they are a good chunk of the demographic of the people we execute.39 What
I want to do is rewind and start from the beginning; I want to figure out
how we could get to this place where it is okay to condemn someone like
Madison in the first place. Then, more briefly, at the end of the talk, I will
ask what it is that we think we are accomplishing when we condemn and
execute the severely mentally ill.40 That is to say, what societal purposes
does this serve? This is an important question because, as I said, the state
is executing in our name. So we ought to know, we ought to be able to
articulate, what it is we are getting out of it when we put these people to
death. Then finally, I will close my remarks with an observation about

35 See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 20 (5th ed. 2013).
36 See id. at 20 (defining mental illness as a “clinically significant disturbance in an
individual’s cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects a dysfunction in the
psychological, biological, or developmental processes underlying mental functioning”); AM.
PSYCHOL. ASS’N, PROFICIENCY IN PSYCHOLOGY: ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT OF SERIOUS
MENTAL ILLNESS 5 (2009) (“[Serious mental illness] refers to mental disorders that carry
certain diagnoses, such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major depression; that are
relatively persistent (e.g., lasting at least a year); and that result in comparatively severe
impairment in major areas of functioning . . . .”).
37 See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, DEATH PENALTY DUE PROCESS REVIEW PROJECT,
SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE DEATH PENALTY 9–14 (2016) (discussing the difference
between mental illness and severe mental illness, as well as the major types of severe mental
illness) [hereinafter AM. BAR ASS’N].
38 See supra note 32.
39 See infra notes 114–148 and accompanying text.
40 See infra Part II.

2019]

THE DEATH PENALTY FOR THE WEAK, NOT THE WORST

215

what all this says about us, because how we treat those who we might
justifiably despise says as much about us as it does about them.41
I. HOW THE SEVERELY MENTALLY ILL END UP IN THE CAPITAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM AND WHY THEY CANNOT GET OUT
How is it that the severely mentally ill end up in the snare of the
capital justice system in the first place? Answering this question is the
main focus of this talk, and so I will be spending the bulk of my time here.
In this regard, there are four pieces of the puzzle that are critical to
understand. Madison is a snapshot of the end of the line, the last piece of
the puzzle. I want to start at the beginning, and in the beginning was
deinstitutionalization.
A. Deinstitutionalization
To have a cohort of severely mentally ill people in the capital justice
system, you have to have a cohort of severely mentally ill people
committing aggravated murder. And to understand how that has come to
pass, you have to understand deinstitutionalization in the 1970s and
reinstitutionalization thereafter through the criminal justice system.
There is much to say about deinstitutionalization, but this is just the first
stop on our journey. There are other stops we need to get to as well, and
Dr. Hudacek has done a nice job of providing some of the details on this
issue during her panel,42 so my overview comments will suffice.
Deinstitutionalization refers to a phenomenon that began in the
1960s, and went into high gear in the 1970s, to move the severely mentally
ill out of state institutions and into the community.43 As a result of
deinstitutionalization, the number of people committed to public
psychiatric hospitals in 1955 had dropped by 87 percent in 1994.44 That
is an astonishingly high percentage. By way of sheer numbers, in 1955,
there were roughly 558,000 severely mentally ill people living in the
nation’s public psychiatric hospitals.45 By 1994, that number was under
72,000—and this was forty years later, when the country’s population had

41

See infra Part III.
Kristen Hudacek, Doctor of Psychology, Dir. of Psychology and Pretrial Forensic
Servs. at E. State Hosp., Panel 2: Mental Health within the Court System at the Regent
University Law Review Annual Symposium (Nov. 2, 2018).
43 See E. FULLER TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING AMERICA’S MENTAL
ILLNESS CRISIS 8 (1997) (defining deinstitutionalization and explaining that the practice
began in 1955, when antipsychotic medication was first introduced, and heightened around
1965, when Medicaid and Medicare funding became available).
44 See id. (explaining that the number of mentally ill patients admitted to hospitals
dropped from 558,239 in 1955 to 71,619 in 1994).
45 Id.
42
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grown by over 50 percent, and its mentally ill population had grown along
with it.46
Who were these people who were deinstitutionalized? For starters,
one had to be significantly mentally ill to be institutionalized in the first
place. Here are the general contours: between 50 to 60 percent of those
who were deinstitutionalized had been diagnosed with schizophrenia.47
Another 10 to 15 percent had organic brain diseases; they were braindamaged as a result of trauma, strokes, Alzheimer’s, that sort of thing.48
Vernon Madison would fall into this category. Another 10 to 15 percent
were diagnosed with manic-depressive disorders or severe depression.49
The idea behind deinstitutionalization was to treat these patients in
the least restrictive setting possible.50 As President Jimmy Carter’s
Commission on Mental Health explained, “[T]he objective [is] maintaining
the greatest degree of freedom, self-determination, autonomy, dignity, and
integrity of body, mind, and spirit for the individual while he or she
participates in treatment or receives services.”51 Deinstitutionalization
was intended to be a progressive policy—an enlightened, more humane
way of treating the severely mentally ill.
The problem was that state legislatures around the country were not
willing to spend the money to give these people, who were now back out
in the community, the mental health services they needed.52 Part of the
reason fiscal conservatives had joined progressives in supporting
deinstitutionalization was to reduce the stress on the public coffers, so
funding for community services did not enjoy the same support that

46 Id. Between 1955 and 1994, the nation’s population grew from 164 million to 260
million, and assuming that the proportion of severely mentally ill stayed roughly the same,
the number of patients in mental hospitals absent deinstitutionalization would have been
around 885,000. Id.
47 Id. at 10.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 10–11.
52 See id. at 10 (discussing how deinstitutionalization aggravated the incidence of
mental illness by discharging patients without ensuring that they received the medicine and
medical services necessary for their reintegration into society); see also Newt Gingrich & Van
Jones, Opinion, Mental Illness is No Crime, CNN (May 27, 2015, 7:57 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2015/05/27/opinions/gingrich-jones-mental-health/index.html (“When
governments closed state-run psychiatric facilities in the late 1970s, it didn’t replace them
with community care . . . .”).
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deinstitutionalization did.53 The mentally ill went without, resulting in a
national mental health crisis.54
And we are still in it today. Over 2.2 million severely mentally ill
people—2.2 million people who are not just suffering from mental illness,
but suffering on the scale of extreme mental impairment and
dysfunction—are out in the community and not receiving psychiatric
treatment.55 They say that the road to hell is paved with good intentions,
and deinstitutionalization is Exhibit A for the old adage being true. Sadly,
most of these people just ended up on the streets.56
And from there, they ended up in correctional facilities. The
phenomenon has been called the “criminalization of the mentally ill,”57
and California is a perfect example. Progressive California was at the
forefront of the deinstitutionalization movement, passing legislation to
effectuate the policy in 1969.58 In its first year of deinstitutionalization,
the number of mentally ill people entering its criminal justice system
doubled.59 By 1975, the number of severely mentally ill individuals in
California’s prisons and jails had grown 300 percent.60 As one prison
psychiatrist in California explained:
We are literally drowning in patients, running around trying to put our
fingers in the bursting dikes, while hundreds of men continue to
deteriorate psychiatrically before our eyes into serious psychoses. . . .
The crisis stems from recent changes in the mental health laws allowing
more mentally sick patients to be shifted away from the mental health
department into the department of corrections.61

Treating the mentally ill in a least restrictive setting turned out to be not
so progressive after all. These people were taken out of mental hospitals
53

Harold Pollack, What Happened to U.S. Mental Health Care After
Deinstitutionalization?, WASH. POST (June 12, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/wonk/wp/2013/06/12/what-happened-to-u-s-mental-health-care-after-deinstitutionalization
/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9a53398b4454.
54 Samantha Raphelson, How the Loss of U.S. Psychiatric Hospitals Led to a Mental
Health Crisis, NPR (Nov. 30, 2017, 1:15 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/11/30/
567477160/how-the-loss-of-u-s-psychiatric-hospitals-led-to-a-mental-health-crisis.
55 Jonaki Bose et al., Key Substance Use and Mental Health Indicators in the United
States: Results from the 2017 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, SAMHSA (Sept.
2018), https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/cbhsq-reports/NSDUHFFR2017/NS
DUHFFR2017.pdf.
56 See TORREY, supra note 43, at 11 (explaining that deinstitutionalized persons did
not successfully reintegrate back to society, but instead they ended up homeless or
incarcerated).
57 See Anastasia Cooper, Note, The Ongoing Correctional Chaos in Criminalizing
Mental Illness: The Realignment’s Effects on California Jails, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J.,
339, 342 (1988).
58 TORREY, supra note 43, at 36.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
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and left on the streets, where many eventually made their way back to
secure beds—but in correctional facilities instead.
Fast forward to today, when jails and prisons are the single largest
residential mental institution in our country.62 A 2010 study concluded
that there are now more than three times more severely mentally ill
persons in jails and prisons than in hospitals.63 In Virginia, for a local
perspective, the Hampton Roads Regional Jail is the state’s largest
repository for the mentally ill.64 Forty-three other states and the District
of Columbia have a similar story to tell.65
Where does all this leave us? When you put these people back in the
community without treatment, they do not have their illness under control
and have little chance of functioning as productive members of society, so
there are going to be issues. Then when you add in substance abuse—and
you have to, because if these people are not on their meds like they need
to be, they are going to be suffering and you can bet they are going to selfmedicate66—what you get is severely mentally ill people who are off their
meds and on substances that impair their judgment and reduce their
inhibitions, and that is going to result in some capital murders. It is worth
noting that people with mental illness are much more likely to be the
victims of violent crime than the perpetrators.67 Indeed, people with
severe mental illness are eleven times more likely to be the victims of a
violent crime than members of the general population.68 But a slice of this
population is also going to victimize; some of the severely mentally ill will
end up committing capital murder.
Of course, to get to death row, capital offenders who are severely
mentally ill first have to get convicted and sentenced to death. One would
think that the capital justice system would weed these people out, but it

62 See Gingrich, supra note 52 (“The estimated number of inmates with mental illness
outstrips the number of patients in state psychiatric hospitals by a factor of 10.”).
63 E. FULLER TORREY, ET AL., MORE MENTALLY ILL PERSONS ARE IN JAILS AND
PRISONS THAN HOSPITALS: A SURVEY OF THE STATES 1, 8 (2010).
64 Dave Ress, Hampton Roads Regional Jail: By Default, Virginia’s Largest Mental
Hospital, DAILYPRESS (July 9, 2016, 5:40 PM), https://www.dailypress.com/news/politics/dpnws-regional-jail-20160710-story.html.
65 Gingrich, supra note 52 (“Today, in 44 states and the District of Columbia, the
largest prison or jail holds more people with serious mental illness than the largest
psychiatric hospital.”).
66 AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, supra note 36, at 3 (“It has been estimated that half of
individuals with SMI will have a co-occurring substance abuse problem at some point in their
lives. Compared with the general population, for example, people with schizophrenia are
more than four times as likely to have a substance use disorder; those with bipolar disorder
are more than five times as likely.”).
67 AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 17.
68 Id.
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does not. Why that is so is the second piece of the puzzle, and the topic I
turn to next.
B. The Capital Litigation Process
The second piece of the puzzle is that the capital litigation process
not only fails to screen out those with severe mental illness, but in many
ways, it does just the opposite—it pulls these people into the dragnet even
more. Both aspects of the problem are important. The first concerns legal
doctrines that one would think would screen out the severely mentally ill,
but often do not. Two, in particular, come to mind.
One is competency to stand trial. This doctrine is grounded in due
process and designed to ensure that defendants can adequately
participate in their defense.69 It turns out to be a very low standard,
requiring only a minimal ability to consult with a lawyer and understand
the proceedings.70 Importantly, a person can have a severe mental illness
and still be legally competent to stand trial.71
A prime example is Scott Panetti, the capital defendant in Panetti v.
Quarterman.72 I will be returning to Panetti v. Quarterman because it is
one of the two leading cases governing competency to be executed,73 but
for now my focus is competency to stand trial. Here are the facts. Scott
Panetti was found competent to stand trial even though he had been
hospitalized more than a dozen times for mental health-related reasons,
diagnosed with schizophrenia, and was suffering from hallucinations.74 He
chose to represent himself in his capital trial in Texas in 1995, and showed
up dressed in a purple cowboy outfit.75 He tried to subpoena the Pope. He
tried to subpoena John F. Kennedy (who, it goes without saying, had long
been dead). He tried to subpoena Jesus Christ.76 As to the latter, I cannot
69 See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385–86 (1966) (holding that the issue of a
defendant’s competency to stand trial implicates his right to a fair trial because it puts in
question his ability to assist in his own defense); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402
(1960) (holding that competence to stand trial requires more than mere recollection of events
and looks at the defendant’s ability to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding).
70 Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402 (“[T]he test must be whether [a defendant] has sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him.”).
71 AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 19.
72 551 U.S. 930 (2007).
73 See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 19–22 (highlighting case studies on the trials
of Scott Panetti and Kelsey Patterson, respectively, to discuss a mentally ill defendant’s
competency to stand trial and the effect of raising an insanity defense).
74 Panetti , 551 U.S. at 936, 940–42.
75 Id. at 935–36; AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 20.
76 Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008 WL 2338498, at *35 (W.D. Tex.
Mar. 26, 2008); AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 20.
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help but think—and I will go ahead and say it since I am here at Regent—
that Jesus was whispering softly in his ear, “Hey Panetti, you don’t have
to subpoena me. I’m always with you.” But Panetti could not hear that
voice, perhaps because he was hearing other voices instead. All this, and
Panetti was found competent to stand trial.77 It is a stunning indictment
of our capital justice system, and a vivid example of just how low the
competency bar actually is. As one might have guessed, Panetti was
convicted and sentenced to death.78
The second doctrine is the insanity defense. The insanity defense is
an affirmative defense to a crime; a defendant pleads not guilty by reason
of insanity (“NGRI”).79 The standard for asserting this defense varies from
state to state, but most states require some showing that as a result of a
mental illness, the defendant did not know the nature of the act that he
or she was doing, or did not know it was wrong, or, in a small number of
states, that the defendant could not control his or her actions.80 Whatever
the version, that is a very narrow test, and it is not going to weed out
people with most mental illnesses, even severe ones.81 You can see this in
how much the doctrine is used: NGRI is asserted in just 1 percent of all
criminal cases, and even then, it is successful only 25 percent of the time.82
NGRI is an especially risky defense in a capital trial, because jurors
tend to view it as a legal loophole that could put the defendant back out
on the streets.83 In practice, that is not what happens; states are pretty
good about involuntarily committing people when they are mentally ill
and have gone out and killed somebody.84 But the fact remains that NGRI
is a complete defense—as in the verdict, if the jury buys it, is not guilty.
That is a tough pill to swallow in a murder trial where the person has
obviously killed the victim. In a moment, I will talk more about how both
doctrines, NGRI and competency to stand trial, end up working against
the severely mentally ill, but for now, the point is that NGRI is rarely
applicable and rarely successful, so it is rarely ever used.

77

Panetti, 551 U.S. at 936.
Id. at 937.
79 AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 20 (discussing the affirmative defense of NGRI).
80 Id.
81 Id. at 21.
82 Id.
83 Id. Although state practice varies, the Supreme Court has held that at least under
federal law, including general federal criminal practice, courts are not required to inform
juries that defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity will be involuntarily committed
and not released into society, rejecting a defendant’s claim that an instruction was needed
to counter jurors’ mistaken perception to the contrary. See Shannon v. United States, 512
U.S. 573 (1994).
84 See id. (explaining that the successful use of the NGRI defense normally results in
a defendant being sent to a psychiatric institution).
78
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By way of example, we could go back to Panetti, as he also pled
NGRI85—unsuccessfully, obviously—but, an equally powerful example is
the case of Kelsey Patterson. Patterson had been diagnosed with paranoid
schizophrenia in 1981 and was in and out of mental hospitals multiple
times in the 1980s.86 In 1992, Patterson walked into a store and randomly
shot a businessman and his administrative assistant.87 He then dropped
his gun, stripped down to his socks—and I mean he took off everything
except for his socks—and paced the floor, mumbling incoherently, until
the police arrived.88 At trial, the jury rejected Patterson’s insanity
defense.89 He was found guilty and sentenced to death.90 So clear was the
evidence of Patterson’s severe mental illness that the Texas Board of
Pardons and Paroles recommended clemency by a vote of five-to-one.91 It
was only the second recommendation for clemency in the Board’s entire
history.92 That recommendation went to the governor, who was Rick Perry
at the time, and he rejected it.93 The State of Texas executed Patterson
the next day.94
Those are the two doctrinal failsafes, the safety valves for those with
serious mental health problems to escape the capital justice system, and
neither does much work in screening out capital offenders with severe
mental illness. The question then becomes whether the capital litigation
process provides other ways to sift out those who are severely mentally ill,
and the reality is that being severely mentally ill in the capital litigation
process actually cuts the other way. Rather than making it less likely that
a defendant will be convicted and sentenced to death, severe mental
illness makes it more so.
There are a number of reasons why this is true. First, the severely
mentally ill are more likely to confess, even to crimes they did not
commit.95 The last panel of today’s symposium is dedicated to
understanding why those with intellectual disabilities and mental illness
are more likely to be falsely convicted so I will not go into detail here, but
it is worth noting that the National Registry of Exonerations lists 103
85

Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 936 (2007).
Patterson v. Cockrell, 69 F. App’x 658, at *1 (5th Cir. 2003); AM. BAR ASS’N, supra
note 37, at 22.
87 Patterson, 69 F. App’x at *1; AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 22.
88 Patterson, 69 F. App’x at *1.
89 Id.; AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 22.
90 Patterson, 69 F. App’x at *1; AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 22.
91 AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 22.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Robert Perske, False Confessions from 53 Persons with Intellectual Disabilities:
The List Keeps Growing, 46 INTELL. AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 468, 468 (2008).
86
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exonerations by those with mental illness or intellectual disability; of
those 103, nearly three-quarters—72 percent—had falsely confessed to
the crime.96 We might have guessed this would be true; the mentally
infirm are more susceptible to manipulation and suggestion, and that
makes them more susceptible to confessing in response to police
interrogation.97 Whether the confession is true or false, the point here is
that the severely mentally ill are more likely to come to trial having given
one, and that makes them more likely to be convicted, which in turn puts
them more at risk of being sentenced to death.
Second, it is more difficult for the severely mentally ill to cooperate
with their lawyer to mount an effective defense.98 For example, they often
have confused and disordered thinking and have difficulty communicating
in ways that make sense, particularly when trying to explain the details
of what happened on a given occasion or when answering questions that
can help piece together a mitigation case based on their social history.99
Sometimes they suffer from paranoia, so they do not trust their lawyers
and as a result, do not share things with them, or even worse, work in
passive-aggressive ways to undermine the representation.100 Sometimes
they do not want to talk about their mental illness, especially if it was
caused by trauma; they just do not want to relive those memories, so they
are utterly uncooperative in building a defense based on their mental
illness.101 And sometimes they also have a personality disorder of some
sort that makes them just plain difficult to work with and, well, difficult

96 Samuel Gross & Maurice Possley, For 50 Years, You’ve Had “The Right to Remain
Silent”, MARSHALL PROJECT (June 12, 2016), https://www.themarshallproject.org/
2016/06/12/for-50-years-you-ve-had-the-right-to-remain-silent; Mary Kelly Tate, Dir., Inst.
for Actual Innocence, and Professor, Univ. of Richmond, Closing Remarks: Mental Health
and Wrongful Convictions/Sentencing at the Regent University Law Review Annual
Symposium (Nov. 2, 2018).
97 Perske, supra note 95, at 468; Saul M. Kassin et. al., Police-Induced Confessions:
Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 L. HUM. BEHAV. 3, 21 (2010), https://www.jstor.org/
stable/40608053?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents (“[P]ersons with mental
illness are over-represented in these [false confession] cases. Psychological disorder is often
accompanied by faulty reality monitoring, distorted perception, impaired judgment, anxiety,
mood disturbance, poor self-control, and feelings of guilt.”).
98 Scott E. Sundby, The True Legacy of Atkins and Roper: The Unreliability Principle,
Mentally Ill Defendants, and the Death Penalty’s Unraveling, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
487, 512–13 (2014). This factor is one of several that support what Professor Scott Sundby
calls the “unreliability principle”—the notion that if the jury cannot reliably take into
account certain factors in mitigation, then the death penalty cannot constitutionally be
imposed. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 31–32 (discussing the unreliability principle and
referring to the Atkins and Roper factors as Sundby factors); Sundby, supra note 98, at 505,
511.
99 AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 23; Sundby, supra note 98, at 514.
100 AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 23; Sundby, supra note 98, at 514.
101 AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 23; Sundby, supra note 98, at 513.
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to like.102 All this makes effective representation of severely mentally ill
capital defendants really, really hard. My hat goes off to the very special
class of lawyers who do capital defense work, especially when it involves
representing the severely mentally ill.
Third, and relatedly, there are some decisions in the capital litigation
process that only the defendant can make. The right to waive the right to
an attorney and represent oneself at trial, the right to waive an appeal,
the right to testify, and the right to plead not guilty, even when the
evidence is overwhelming and a plea deal would take death off the table—
all these are decisions that belong to the defendant alone.103 As the Panetti
case showed, severe mental illness can lead to some really bad decisions,
and that can mean the difference between life and death.
Fourth and finally, the drugs that severely mentally ill people need
to take in order to get their illness under control tend to make their
emotional affect appear flat, which is particularly bad in a capital trial
because it can be mistakenly interpreted as a lack of remorse.104 That said,
the alternative may be worse. If mentally ill capital defendants do not take
their meds because they do not want their affect to be flat, they run the
risk of showing up at trial looking agitated, disruptive, and out of
control.105 Then they are dangerous looking, and that is the last thing they
want to be, at least if they want the jury to choose life.106
Everything I have said thus far has been about the trial process, but
the sentencing phase of a capital trial poses special dangers for the
severely mentally ill as well. Under the law, mental illness is a mitigating
circumstance—something the jury considers in determining whether a
convicted murderer is among the worst of the worst for whom a death
sentence is appropriate.107 But research shows that juries often use severe
mental illness as an aggravator instead.108 You may have heard of the
Capital Jury Project; it is a National Science Foundation-funded project
102 See Sam Glover, Learn to Deal with Mentally-Ill Clients, LAWYERIST.COM (Feb. 19,
2014), https://lawyerist.com/deal-with-mentally-ill-clients/ (providing a candid discussion of
the challenges of representing the mentally ill).
103 See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398–99 (1993) (holding that a defendant who
is competent to stand trial is competent to make decisions belonging to client alone, such as
whether to plead guilty and whether to waive the right to an attorney and proceed pro se).
104 AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 32; Sundby, supra note 98, at 515.
105 AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 23.
106 See id. (discussing how jurors are more likely to find the death sentence
appropriate if they perceive a defendant as dangerous).
107 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982) (treating a defendant’s mental and
emotional development as a mitigating factor for sentencing); e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 607 (1978) (recognizing mental deficiency as a mitigating circumstance).
108 See Ellen Fels Berkman, Note, Mental Illness as an Aggravating Circumstance in
Capital Sentencing, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 291, 299 (1989) (explaining that once mental illness
is introduced in mitigation, the prosecution may use it as an aggravating factor because of a
likelihood of future dangerousness).
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aimed at finding out how capital jurors think—when they choose death
and why, that sort of thing.109 What the Capital Jury Project’s research
has shown is that a claim of either insanity or incompetence to stand trial
is one of the strongest correlates with a death sentence.110 That does not
prove causation, of course; it is just a strong association. But when you
think about the reasons that jurors choose death—and a finding of “future
dangerousness” is right up there111—this makes complete sense. When a
jury sees a killer with a severe mental illness, someone so sick as to plead
insanity or to say he or she is not even competent to stand trial, there is a
good chance the jury is going to check the box for future dangerousness.112
If mental illness makes a person dangerous (and if the illness played any
part in the murder, there is reason to think that is true), then it makes
sense for a jury to think that the person is going to be dangerous going
forward. That is just intrinsic to the nature of the person’s mental illness.
It is a part of who that person is.113
All the factors I have discussed result in a substantial proportion of
severely mentally ill people in our prisons generally, and on death row
specifically. By way of comparison, around 4 percent of the general
population suffers from a severe mental illness.114 When you look at the
percentage of those with severe mental illness in our correctional
facilities, that figure jumps to around 10 percent—more than double what
you see in the general population.115 And when you look at death row, that
percentage doubles again; at least 20 percent of the condemned on death
row suffer from a severe mental illness.116 That brings me to death row.
109 What
is the Capital Jury Project, U. ALBANY SCH. CRIM. JUST.,
https://www.albany.edu/scj/13189.php (last visited Feb. 3, 2019).
110 See DAVID BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 644–45 app. L,
sched. 9 (1990) (providing the statistical models from the McCleskey v. Kemp case that was
relied upon by Christopher Slobogin to support the assertion that the insanity defense is
correlated to the death sentence at a very high level of statistical significance); Christopher
Slobogin, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty, 24 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP.
667, 669–70 (2000) (discussing similar findings in other studies).
111 Sundby, supra note 98, at 519 n.175 (discussing research in which “jurors cited the
concern that ‘the defendant might pose a future danger to society’ as the factor that made
them most likely to impose a death sentence”). So important is future dangerousness to the
capital sentencing decision that Scott Sundby calls it part of the capital jury’s “hippocratic
oath”—that having convicted the defendant of capital murder, their duty is “ensuring that,
above all else, the defendant will never kill again.” Scott E. Sundby, War and Peace in the
Jury Room: How Capital Juries Reach Unanimity, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 103, 117 (2010).
112 Id. at 519.
113 See id. (summarizing a jury’s decision to vote in favor of imposing the death penalty
as based on the incurable nature of the defendant’s mental illness).
114 Mental Illness, NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH (Nov. 2017), https://www.nimh.
nih.gov/health/statistics/mental-illness.shtml (estimating the prevalence of serious mental
illness among the U.S. adult population at 4.2% as of 2016).
115 AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 15.
116 Id. at 16.
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C. Death Row
If a capital offender is not suffering from mental illness before
arriving on death row, there is a good chance he or she will develop one
just as a result of being there. In virtually every state, death row consists
of solitary confinement where the condemned are kept for at least 22 hours
each day in the confines of a windowless cell the size of a standard parking
lot space.117 Take a moment to think about just how small that is. They
are monitored by cameras, spoken to through intercoms, and fed through
a slot in the door.118 They have limited access to books and magazines, and
virtually no contact with other human beings.119 These are the conditions
of solitary confinement on death row, and the condemned are subject to
its hallmarks—extreme isolation and forced idleness—for agonizingly
long periods of time.
How long, you are probably wondering. In 1987, the average time
between death sentence and execution was seven years.120 In 1997, the
average time between death sentence and execution was 11 years.121 In
2007, it was a little less than 13 years.122 And in 2017, the average time
on death row of those executed that year was 19 years. 123 Nineteen years
in solitary confinement. Just take a moment to let that sink in.
One might respond by saying, “Then just hurry the heck up.” And
that would be a reasonable response, except for the fact that two-thirds of
all death sentences are reversed, and the top two reasons for reversal are
prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel.124 Those
are not mere legal technicalities; those are serious errors that go to the
very heart of the capital justice system and the state’s ability to put
someone to death. Then there is the estimated 4 percent of factually
117 Corinna Barrett Lain, Following Finality: Why Capital Punishment Is Collapsing
Under Its Own Weight, in FINAL JUDGMENTS: THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICAN LAW AND
CULTURE 30, 40 (Austin Sarat, ed., 2017).
118 Id.
119 See David. R. Dow, Life Without Parole: A Different Death Penalty, THE NATION,
(Oct. 26, 2012), https://www.thenation.com/article/life-without-parole-different-deathpenalty/.
120 See Time on Death Row, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.
org/time-death-row (last visited Jan. 31, 2019) (averaging time between sentencing and
execution at 86 months in 1987).
121 See id. (averaging time between sentencing and execution at 133 months in 1997).
122 See id. (averaging time between sentencing and execution at 153 months in 2007).
123 See Execution List 2017, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org
/execution-list-2017 (last visited Jan. 31, 2019) (providing a list of condemned inmates
executed in 2017 and the amount of time each spent on death row).
124 James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 19731995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1850 (2000); Fox Butterfield, Death Sentences Being Overturned
in 2 of 3 Appeals, N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB, https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/
library/national/061200death-penalty.html (June 12, 2000).
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innocent people still sitting on death row.125 So no, I do not think the right
answer is to just cut off appeals and speed up the back end of the process.
In any event, what extreme isolation for extreme periods of time
produces is something psychologists call “isolation sickness.”126 In the
context of the condemned, it is also known as “death row syndrome.”127
Research shows that even a few days in solitary confinement will cause a
shift in EEG patterns indicative of cerebral dysfunction.128 Over time, the
effects are debilitating, and what psychologists are seeing among those on
death row is similar to the damage suffered by victims of severe sensory
deprivation torture techniques.129 One study reported that of prisoners in
isolation, 91 percent suffered from anxiety, 88 percent suffered from
ruminations or intrusive thoughts, 86 percent suffered from
hypersensitivity to stimuli, 84 percent had difficulty with concentration
and memory, 84 percent had confused thought process, 71 percent
experienced severe mood and emotional swings, 61 percent had violent
fantasies, 44 percent experienced perceptual distortions, and 41 percent
had hallucinations.130 In the same study, 34 percent of the prisoners
experienced all eight of these effects, and 56 percent experienced at least
five of them.131
For those with severe mental illness coming in, the adverse effects of
solitary confinement are even more damaging. Studies show that the
stressors of extreme isolation make everything worse for those with
preexisting mental health problems; it exacerbates the problems they
already have.132 As one federal judge put the point, “[P]utting mentally ill
prisoners in isolated confinement ‘is the mental equivalent of putting an
asthmatic in a place with little air.’”133 The sick get sicker, and they just
languish that way, getting sicker and sicker, until it is time for them to

125 Samuel R. Gross et al., Rate of False Conviction of Criminal Defendants Who Are
Sentenced to Death, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7230, 7230, 7234 (2014), https://www.
pnas.org/content/pnas/111/20/7230.full.pdf.
126 Lain, supra note 117, at 40; see also Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in LongTerm Solitary and “Supermax” Confinement, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 124, 134–37 (2003),
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0011128702239239 (discussing death row
syndrome and isolation sickness outside of the capital context).
127 Lain, supra note 117, at 40.
128 Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U.J.L. &
POL’Y 325, 331 (2006).
129 Haney, supra note 126, at 131–32.
130 Id. at 136–37.
131 Id. at 137.
132 Jeffrey L. Metzner & Jamie Fellner, Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness in
U.S. Prisons: A Challenge for Medical Ethics, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 104, 104–05
(2010).
133 Id. at 105 (quoting Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1265 (N.D. Cal. 1995)).
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die. And that brings me to the last piece of the puzzle, competency to be
executed.
D. Competency to be Executed
I have finally made my way back to Madison v. Alabama, where our
journey began,134 and now we know a lot more about how the severely
mentally ill could be at risk of execution in the first place. But there is still
one more legal failsafe, one more safety net that could spare the severely
mentally ill, and that is the requirement that they be competent to be
executed.
At the moment, there are just two Supreme Court cases on this issue;
Madison will make three. The first of those is Ford v. Wainwright, which
the Court decided in 1986.135 Ford was convicted of murder in 1974, and
by 1982, after eight years on death row, his mental health had
deteriorated.136 He started referring to himself as Pope John Paul III, he
boasted of thwarting a Klu Klux Klan conspiracy to bury dead prisoners
inside the prison walls, and he claimed to have appointed nine new
justices to the Florida Supreme Court (which, by the looks of it, did not
help him much).137 Ford also claimed that he could control the governor
through mind waves, and that executing him was part of a Satanic
conspiracy to keep him from preaching the gospel.138 The Supreme Court
looked at all this and said that it has always been clear that you could not
execute the insane, because, well, they are insane.139 But even here, the
Court did not go on to hold that Ford was insane; the Court just said there
had to be a process for figuring this out, and there was not a process
here.140 So, they sent the case back to Florida to figure out a process, and
in the meantime, Ford, who was still languishing on death row, died of
natural causes. At the time of his death, he was just 37 years old.141
The other case on competency to be executed is Panetti v.
Quarterman.142 I have already talked about the facts—Panetti was the
guy who showed up at trial wearing a purple cowboy outfit and tried to
subpoena Jesus Christ143—so here I will cut to the chase. The Supreme
134

For a discussion of Madison, see supra notes 2–28 and accompanying text.
477 U.S. 399 (1986).
136 Id. at 401–02.
137 Id. at 402.
138 Id. at 403.
139 Id. at 407–08.
140 Id. at 416–18.
141 Alvin Ford, 37, Dies; Stricken on Death Row, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 1991),
https://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/09/obituaries/alvin-ford-37-dies-stricken-on-deathrow.html.
142 551 U.S. 930 (2007).
143 For further details, see supra notes 72–78 and accompanying text.
135
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Court in Panetti did not say that Panetti could not be executed. What the
Court said is that to be competent, Panetti needed a rational
understanding of the reason the state wanted to execute him, and as was
the case in Ford, the state had failed to provide an adequate process for
figuring that out.144 Fast forward to today, and the State of Texas is still
trying to execute Scott Panetti, who appears to be sick as ever.145
Now you know the standard governing competency to be executed—
a capital offender must have a rational understanding of the reason that
the state wants to put him or her to death—and you know how it has
played out. Knowing that, you also know that competency to be executed
does not do much to keep the severely mentally ill from being executed. If
there is any doubt about that, just look at who it is we execute in this
country. One study looking at executions from the years 2000 to 2015
found that 43 percent of those executed had been diagnosed with a severe
mental illness.146 In 2015 alone, seven of the 28 people executed suffered
from a diagnosed severe mental illness, while another seven suffered from
serious intellectual impairment or brain injury.147 In short, fully half of
the people we executed in 2015 had some sort of serious intellectual
impairment or dysfunction. When it comes to “volunteers”—condemned
inmates who wave their appeals and say just execute me, I cannot take
this anymore—more than 75 percent have some sort of documented
mental illness.148
This is who we execute. The question that naturally follows is why—
why would we want to do that? What purpose does it serve?

144 See Panetti, 551 U.S. at 948, 959 (defining competency to be executed and reversing
finding of competency by state court for its failure to provide adequate means by which to
submit expert psychiatric evidence supporting Panetti’s claim).
145 See Jolie McCullough, Texas Death Row Inmate Scott Panetti to Get Further
Competency Review, TEX. TRIB. (July 11, 2017 8:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/
2017/07/11/texas-death-row-inmate-scott-panetti-get-further-competency-review/ (reporting
that the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s denial of relief for Panetti
on his claim of incompetence to be executed, and noting that “prison guards have noticed
Panetti acting delusional and he has claimed to be the father of singer Selena Gomez and
said CNN anchor Wolf Blitzer showed his stolen prison ID card on the news”).
146 Frank R. Baumgartner & Betsy Neill, Does the Death Penalty Target People Who
are Mentally Ill? We Checked., WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/04/03/does-the-death-penalty-targetpeople-who-are-mentally-ill-we-checked/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9cca739b0bae.
147 2015 Executions: A Broken Capital Punishment System, CHARLES HAMILTON
HOUS. (2015), https://charleshamiltonhouston.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/2015-CH
HIRJ-Death-Penalty-Report.pdf.
148 John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: “Volunteers,” Suicide and Competency, 103
MICH. L. REV. 939, 962 (2005).
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II. WHAT PURPOSE DOES EXECUTING THE SEVERELY MENTALLY ILL
SERVE?
What is it that we are trying to accomplish when we execute the
severely mentally ill? This is an important question, because as I
mentioned at the beginning of this talk, the state is executing in our name.
So we ought to be able to answer that question. We ought to be able to
articulate what it is that we are getting out of it when we put these people
to death.
This was the question I found myself asking in Madison. I mean, who
is even pushing to execute this guy? He is blind, he is disoriented, he
urinates on himself, and he cannot remember what he did.149 He is
completely pathetic. It is hard to imagine that even staunch death penalty
supporters are eager to push this rock uphill; the last thing they want is
for people to feel sorry for the guy who gets executed. So where is all this
going?
Here is Alabama’s answer to that question from oral arguments in
Madison: “The state would still have a strong interest in seeking
retribution for a horrible crime . . . even if [the condemned inmate] can’t
remember the crime.”150 Later in the argument, the state’s representative
says it again: “[N]othing about Mr. Madison’s conditions impact the state’s
interest in seeking retribution for a . . . heinous crime.”151 At least
Alabama was clear: its interest is retribution.
To be fair, in the state’s brief, Alabama also makes an argument
about deterrence,152 but it is hard to think that is what is really at stake
because the claim does not even get mentioned at oral argument. After the
National Research Council’s 2012 report on deterrence and the death
penalty, it is easy to see why—as the 2012 report states, the evidence does
not support the claim that the death penalty deters murder, so we should
leave deterrence out of the debate.153 Besides, what does that deterrence
argument look like—we execute even the severely mentally ill, so we sure
as heck will execute you? As the Supreme Court concluded when it
149

See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.
Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 44.
151 Id. at 48.
152 Brief of Respondent, supra note 20, at 38–40 (arguing that impairments diminish
the deterrent effect of capital punishment only if the impairment took hold prior to the
commission of the crime).
153 See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 2
(Daniel S. Nagin & John V. Pepper eds., 2012) (“The committee concludes that research to
date on the effect of capital punishment on homicide is not informative about whether capital
punishment decreases, increases, or has no effect on homicide rates. Therefore, the
committee recommends that these studies not be used to inform deliberations requiring
judgments about the effect of the death penalty on homicide. . . . [and] should not influence
policy judgments about capital punishment.”).
150
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invalidated the death penalty for the intellectually disabled (as opposed
to the mentally ill) in the 2002 case Atkins v. Virginia, exempting the
intellectually disabled from the death penalty will not harm whatever
deterrent effect it might have for everyone else, and including them will
not further it because they are not operating at a level that deterrence
requires.154 I have to think that Alabama did not mention deterrence at
oral argument because after Atkins and the National Research Council’s
2012 report, there was not much to say.
That brings me back to retribution, and I do believe that is what is
really at stake here, just as that is what the death penalty is about more
broadly. Today’s death penalty is not about deterrence, or incapacitation,
and it is certainly not about saving money. It is about retribution.155 It is
about avenging the lives of those who were mercilessly slain.
Now, I do not claim to know how the Supreme Court will come out in
Madison, and the issue there is not whether retribution is a legitimate
state interest in executing the severely mentally ill (although it is not
unrelated). But it merits mention that what the Supreme Court in Atkins
had to say about retribution in the context of executing the intellectually
disabled is equally applicable to the severely mentally ill. There the Court
stated:
[Intellectually disabled] persons frequently know the difference
between right and wrong and are competent to stand trial. . . . [B]y
definition, they have diminished capacities to understand and process
information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from
experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to
understand the reactions of others. . . . Their deficiencies do not warrant
an exemption from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their
personal culpability.156
154 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002) (“The theory of deterrence in capital sentencing is
predicated upon the notion that the increased severity of the punishment will inhibit
criminal actors from carrying out murderous conduct. Yet it is the same cognitive and
behavioral impairments that make these defendants less morally culpable—for example, the
diminished ability to understand and process information, to learn from experience, to
engage in logical reasoning, or to control impulses—that also make it less likely that they
can process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a result,
control their conduct based upon that information. Nor will exempting the mentally retarded
from execution lessen the deterrent effect of the death penalty with respect to offenders who
are not mentally retarded. Such individuals are unprotected by the exemption and will
continue to face the threat of execution.”).
155 Polling
data
supports
the
point.
See
Death
Penalty,
GALLUP,
https://news.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx (last visited Feb. 3, 2019) (reporting
the reasons why proponents of the death penalty support using the death penalty, and that
the number one reason for supporting the death penalty is “[a]n eye for an eye/[t]hey took a
life/[f]its the crime”).
156 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. The 2002 Atkins opinion used the term “mentally retarded”
to refer to this class of individuals. However, in 2010, President Barack Obama signed a bill
into law, which removed “mentally retarded” from the U.S. Code and replaced it with the
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The Court went on to say that the state’s interest in retribution
“necessarily depends on the culpability of the offender,” and when it came
to the death penalty, that interest was legitimate only to the extent “the
most deserving of execution are put to death.”157 The defendant in Atkins
had committed a capital crime; his convictions for abduction, armed
robbery, and capital murder were deserving.158 But for the death penalty,
that was not enough. “Because of their disabilities in areas of reasoning,
judgment, and control of their impulses,” the Court explained, “[the
intellectually disabled] do not act with the level of moral culpability that
characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct.”159 Atkins may
have committed the worst crime, but he was not in the category of the
worst offenders. As such, he was not among the worst of the worst for
whom death was appropriate.
Based on Atkins—what it said about the intellectually disabled
having diminished moral culpability applies with full force to the severely
mentally ill too—there is good reason to think that the state’s interest in
retribution is not legitimate when it comes to executing the severely
mentally ill. But if that is true, then I am back to my question: what is it
that we get out of it when we execute the severely mentally ill?
I have a view—a fear actually—and I am going to share it. It comes
from Ford, the case in which the Supreme Court first held that executing
the insane was unconstitutional (and then did next to nothing to stop
it).160 In Ford, the Court paused to consider what purpose the state could
possibly have in executing the insane in the first place, and its observation
as to the answer is one that I have always found deeply disturbing,
haunting even. It was what the Court called “the barbarity of exacting
mindless vengeance.”161
Mindless vengeance. It fits all too well in the context of executing the
severely mentally ill. It is vengeance, a dark twist on retribution,162 and it
term “intellectually disabled.” Rosa’s Law, Pub. L. No. 111-256, 124 Stat. 2643 (2010)
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1140(2)(A) (2012)).
157 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
158 See id. at 307 (recognizing that defendant Atkins was sentenced to death for his
conviction of abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder).
159 Id. at 306.
160 See supra notes 135–141 and accompanying text.
161 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986).
162 For a discussion of the difference between retribution, which is viewed as a
legitimate penological purpose, and vengeance, which is not, and an argument that the two
are not so different after all, see Corinna Barrett Lain, The Highs and Lows of Wild Justice,
50 TULSA L. REV. 503, 515 (2015) (“Revenge, social scientists tell us, involves the emotional
pleasure of retaliating past wrongs by making the offender suffer. Retribution can embody
that concept, but it can also embody the closely related principle of just deserts, which aims
to restore some sense of balance by imposing punishment proportional to the wrong
committed. One is about retaliation, the other about restoration, but the distinction is a thin
reed. The restorative principle at work in just deserts is the talion—an eye for an eye, life
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is mindless. It is mindless in the sense of recognizing the lack of full
mental capacity of the offender, and it is mindless in the way that states
have shown no interest in recognizing the reduced culpability of the
severely mentally ill. Blood has been shed and a price must be paid; the
victim must be avenged, no matter how pathetic the offender. As the
Supreme Court in Ford recognized, there is indeed a barbarity in that
endeavor, which leads me to my last point.
III. WHAT EXECUTING THE SEVERELY MENTALLY ILL SAYS ABOUT US
The fact that we execute the severely mentally ill in this country
might seem bizarre to outsiders, but it (unfortunately) makes more sense
when considered in the larger death penalty context. Here, I am reminded
of what Henry Schwarzchild, who led the ACLU’s Capital Punishment
Project in the early 1970s and later founded the National Coalition to
Abolish the Death Penalty,163 once said about the death penalty. He wrote:
[W]e have always picked quite arbitrarily a tiny handful of people among those
convicted of murder to be executed, not those who have committed the most
heinous, the most revolting, the most destructive murders, but always the poor,
the black, the friendless, the life’s losers, those without competent, private
attorneys, the illiterate, those despised or ignored by the community for reasons
having nothing to do with their crime. . . . The penalty of death is imposed almost
entirely upon members of what the distinguished social psychologist Kenneth B.
Clark has referred to as “the lower status elements of American society.”164

If you spend any time at all studying the American death penalty, you
know this to be true. It was true back in 1972, when the Supreme Court
invalidated the death penalty for the very reason that this was true.165 It
was true in 1976, when the Court reinstated the death penalty under the
promise that it would no longer be true.166 And it is true today. The reality
of the death penalty is that it is not for the worst of the worst. It is for the
weak among the worst—the most vulnerable capital offenders in a variety
for a life—and that is also what gives rise to the anticipated emotional satisfaction of
revenge. In that sense, retribution and revenge are just two sides of the same coin; what the
state does as retribution, the victim experiences as revenge.”).
163 For a more detailed description of Schwarzchild’s work in this area, see HERBERT
H. HAINES, AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 61–62 (1996), https://ebookcentral-proquestcom.ezproxy.regent.edu/lib/regent-ebooks/detail.action?docID=270937.
164 Henry Schwarzchild, In Opposition to Death Penalty Legislation, in THE DEATH
PENALTY IN AMERICA 364, 366–67 (Hugo Adam Bedau 3d ed. 1982).
165 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (holding that the imposition
of the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment); id. at 240, 255–57 (Douglas,
J., concurring) (reasoning that the death penalty amounts to a cruel and unusual
punishment because it is imposed discriminatorily—selectively being applied to the poor,
suspect classes, and unpopular minorities—thereby violating the equal protection clause,
which is implicit in the ban against such punishments).
166 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (holding that the concerns in
Furman regarding the discriminatory imposition of the death penalty may be addressed
through a precisely worded statute).
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of ways—and executing those with severe mental illness is just Exhibit A
for my claim.
What, then, does this say about us? As Bryan Stevenson told the
Justices during his oral argument in the Madison case, “[T]he Eighth
Amendment isn’t just a window. It’s a mirror.”167 It says something about
us as a society.
What, then, does it say that not a single death penalty state in the
Union exempts the ultimate punishment for the severely mentally ill? Not
one.168 Since 2006, the American Psychological Association, the American
Psychiatric Association, and the National Alliance on Mental Illness have
opposed the death penalty for mentally ill offenders.169 The ABA has
likewise issued a statement saying these people are seriously sick; they
are not the worst of the worst murderers and should not be executed.170
One observer noted, “[T]o my knowledge, this is the very first time in
history that those four organizations have adopted the same position on
anything.”171 People paying attention, people in the know—they find this
indefensible. And by and large, we don’t defend it. We don’t need to; it is
just what we do. What does that say about our thirst for “exacting
mindless vengeance”?172
Over 150 years ago Dostoyevsky wrote, “The degree of civilization in
a society can be judged by entering its prisons.”173 Justice Kennedy quoted
167

Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 60.
See generally ELIZABETH DAVIS & TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU
OF JUST. STATS., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2016 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/cp16sb.pdf (summarizing the states that allow the death penalty without
recognizing any specific exception for the severely mentally ill). But see Terence Lenamon,
Terry Lenamon’s List of State Death Penalty Mitigation Statutes, JDSUPRA (May 10, 2010),
https://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=d61d8c7b-896b-4c1a-bd87f86425206b45 (listing the mitigating factors, one of which is mental illness, for each state
that still allows the imposition of the death penalty).
169 See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 34–36 (discussing opposition to the death
penalty for severely mentally ill offenders by leading professional organizations); AM.
PSYCHOL. ASS’N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH
PENALTY 12 (2005) (advocating a policy that automatically commutes a death sentence to a
lesser punishment for those individuals found incompetent for execution); see also E.
Packard, Associations Concur on Mental Disability and Death Penalty Policy, MONITOR ON
PSYCHOL. 14, 14 (2007) (discussing how the American Psychological Association, the
American Bar Association, the American Psychiatric Association, and the National Alliance
on Mental Illness drafted a policy excluding persons with severe mental disorders from
capital punishment).
170 AM. BAR ASS’N, RECOMMENDATION 122A: MENTAL ILLNESS RESOLUTION pmbl.
(2006), available at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/
death_penalty_moratorium/mental_illness_policies.authcheckdam.pdf.
171 See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 8.
172 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986).
173 THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 210 (Fred R. Shapiro ed. 2006) (reproducing a
translation of a portion of Fyodor Dostoyevski’s The House of the Dead).
168
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this language in a 2015 concurrence and added, “There is truth to this in
our own time.”174 At the time, Justice Kennedy was writing about how we
treat those on death row,175 but those words are also true when it comes
to who we put on death row in the first place.
Maybe, just maybe, the facts of Madison will be over the line; maybe
the Supreme Court will finally say that a state has gone too far. But, in
my mind, we should have never come this close to the line in the first
place. To do so says more about our moral failings, our barbarity, than it
says about those who we execute.
Thank you.
**Editor’s note: Subsequent to this keynote speech, the Supreme Court
decided Madison, holding that in evaluating competency to be executed, a
court must look not at the diagnosis, but rather at its downstream
consequence—namely, whether it precluded the inmate from having a
rational understanding of why the state wants to execute—and remanded
for the court to determine that in the first instance under the clarified
standard. See Madison v. Alabama, 139 S.Ct. 718 (2019).

174
175

Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 2209.

